On Wednesday, the Kerala High Court acquitted a mother who had been found guilty of murdering her sole child, a 9-year-old boy, by a trial court. [Teena vs. Kerala State]
Justices K Vinod Chandran and C Jayachandran of the Division Bench concluded that there may be more than meets the eye, but investigators lack the sensitivity to recognise it.
"When a woman kills her progeny there is more than that meets the eye; which sensitivity, often, the investigators lack," the Court said in its judgement allowing the mother's appeal.
The mother was accused of carrying out the heinous deed in order to exact vengeance on her husband, with whom she had a deteriorating and abusive marriage. However, the Court determined that assigning motive simply for this reason would be unjust.
"None can ferret out the feelings of a distressed woman and it is difficult to fathom the despair of a woman subjected to constant domestic abuse. But based on such surmises, it would be unfair to find motive of revenge, that too in a case where a beleaguered woman is accused of killing her own child," the Court said in this regard.
The Court expressed severe displeasure with the trial court's reliance on a presumed deathbed pronouncement of the mother, who went on to survive the suicide attempt, in convicting her.
The Court held that when dying pronouncements develop into confessions, judicial personnel must pause and follow the beneficial statutory procedure outlined in Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subsections (2) to (4).
"The Magistrate is not merely acting as a scribe. It is the status as a judicial officer, well versed in law, which motivated the Legislators to treat the statement recorded under Section 164 at a higher plane than those recorded by the police under Section 161, which would also inspire the Court analysing the evidence. The moment, a dying declaration transforms itself into a confession, with the possibility of the declarant being accused of the offence itself, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to pause and comply with the salutary statutory procedure prescribed under sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 164," the judgment stated.
The mother who filed the appeal was accused of giving sleeping medications to her child and then slitting his left wrist with a razor blade while he was dozing and smothering him with a cloth while he was snoozing.
Later, the accused allegedly ingested poison and slashed the vein in her right hand with the same razor blade, intending to commit suicide.
The trial court mainly relied on a statement allegedly made by the accused to the doctors who treated her in finding her guilty of the offences charged under Sections 302 (murder) and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing her accordingly.
The accused's lawyer, PK Varghese, contended that the reliance on the purported dying declaration is illegal under the law.
The trial court's exercise of Section 311 power was criticised by counsel because the matter was reopened and two witnesses were summoned after the case was posted for judgement.
S Ambikadevi, a senior government politician, contended that while the declaration is not a confession under Section 164, it is nonetheless relevant under the Evidence Act.
The Court's main concern was whether the extrajudicial confession, in this case, was a dying declaration, a confession, an admission, or just a statement under S.164.
According to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the declarations of the declarant, in this case, are confessions of a crime and do not fall under the concept of a dying declaration because she lived and was not in fear of death at the time the statement was provided.
As a result, the Court determined that it is inadmissible under Article 20(3) unless it is documented in accordance with Section 164 sub-sections (2) to (4).
"If we look at the statement recorded and the clear expression of opinion of the Doctor that she is not in a critical stage; when statements were made inculpating herself of a homicide, the Judicial Officer ought to have cautioned her of the implications of the further statements," the Court stated.
The Judge considered whether the trial court was overly zealous in summoning the witness for re-examination under Section 311 CrPC when the prosecution had not requested it.
The witness was asked to provide the case sheet and give evidence "for the just decision of the case," according to the Court (sic).
"The principles propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are sure, does not merely mandate a hollow reiteration of the words employed in the provision: 'for a just decision of the case'. There should be strong and valid reasons recorded, however brief, as to the exercise of that power, facilitating a just decision," the Court opined.
As a result, the Court ruled that the invocation of the power under Section 311 CrPC was unconstitutional in this case.
The Court noted that the husband had a history of addiction and mental illness, as well as the fact that the accused wife had claimed that he had been abusive on several occasions.
However, the Court was unable to determine definitively that this demonstrated the purpose of the child's murder and subsequent suicide attempt.
The Court concluded, after reviewing the other facts and circumstances of the case, that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the sessions judge had made errors in the marshalling of facts and scrutiny of evidence.
As a result, the accused was acquitted by the High Court.