Chief Justice of India (CJI) N.V. Ramana spoke recently of the need to “move away from colonial rules followed in the country’s legal system, and towards an ‘Indianisation’ of the same”.
What this means in concrete terms is not immediately apparent.
In the post-independence decades, ‘Indianisation’ has not signified any particular trajectory of change. Sometimes, it has coincided with the democratisation of public spaces, or increased access, or more transparency. At other times, however, it has meant quite the opposite: the crystallisation of the idea of a ‘strong nation state’, with fewer deliberations and debates. ‘Indianisation’ has also meant, for some, a conflation of the country with particularist religo-cultural representations.
Earlier this year, the government successfully made the argument before the Supreme Court that India is only a representational democracy, and not a participative one. In other words, that the extent of peoples’ participation is limited to electing representatives and then leaving the majority government alone to get on with the job. In this view of things, challenges to state policy, or state action, are seen as disruptive. If the ruling establishment gets particularly worked up, it can also label these challenges ‘anti-Indian’.
We should bear in mind that this “government knows best” argument has been made many times before. The first amendment to the constitution of India was brought within 16 months of its adoption, by the provisional parliament, even before the first government was elected. The provisional parliament was led by the interim prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The amendment allowed the state to occasionally restrict the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression on grounds that it may cause public disorder. This was a reaction to fears about the stability of the new republic in its founding moments, in the face of increasing ‘crowd action’ relating to the partition of India, peasant movements in Telangana, food shortages etc.
By bringing in the first amendment, which also brought in other changes relating to property rights etc., the provisional parliament sought to ensure for the state the power to restrict speeches and crowds that might lead to any kind of public disorder.
This amendment was opposed within the provisional parliament by those who felt that the new Indian republic must trust its dissenting crowds.
Siddharth Narrain describes the debate as a question about where to place ‘Indian’ legitimacy: in the provisional parliament and the fledgling post-colonial state; or amidst the unorganised crowds. When the first amendment was approved, it would seem that ‘Indianisation’ tilted a bit towards the state.
India’s early elected popular governments continued to repurpose colonial laws and apply them to the free country. Equally, the republic’s citizens continued to legally ‘push back’ in recognition of their own constitutional status. Rohit De’s book A People’s Constitution describes these contestations of ‘Indianisation’.