Double jeopardy is a legal defense that prohibits a convicted person from being charged again after a legitimate acquittal or conviction on the same (or similar) charges and the same evidence. If this question is posed, proof will be brought before the court, which will usually decide, as a preliminary matter, whether the plea is substantiated; if so, proceedings will be precluded from the projected trial. The protection against being "twice put in jeopardy" is a fundamental right in some nations, including Canada, Mexico and the United States. Defense is given in other countries by statute. A defendant can enter a per emptory plea of autrefo in common law countries, is acquitted (previously acquitted) orautrefo is convicted, with the same effect. The doctrine seems to have arisen in Roman law, in the non bis in idem rule ("an issue once decided must not be raised again").
Double jeopardy In India, conditional protection from double jeopardy is a fundamental right guaranteed in accordance with Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution, which states that 'no person shall be tried and punished more than once for the same offence.' The definition of autrefois convict enshrines this clause, whereby no one convicted of an offence can be tried or punished a second time. It does not, however, apply to anotherfo is acquitted, and so if a person is acquitted of a crime, he may be retried. In India, protection against acquitis autrefois is a constitutional right, not a specific one. Such protection is given not by the Constitution, but by rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
For double threat defence, there are several explanations:
# To avoid the government from using its superior power to wear down innocent people and erroneously prosecute them.
# To shield people from the economic, mental, and social repercussions of successive prosecutions.
# To protect the intent and dignity of criminal trials, which would be undermined if it were authorised by the government to disregard verdicts it did not like.
# To reduce prosecutorial authority over the method of prosecuting and
# To eliminate judicial discretion, otherwise not explicitly forbidden by statute, to enforce cumulative penalties.
Eligibility For Double Jeopardy Defense: Only some forms of criminal cases qualify for protection from double jeopardy. If a particular proceeding does not put an individual at risk, then there is no ban on future proceedings against that individual for the same actions. While the text of the Fifth Amendment implies that the defence of double threats applies only to 'life or limb' cases, the Supreme Court has established that the right is not restricted to capital offences or corporal punishment. Instead, immunity applies, regardless of the sentences they prescribe, to all felonies, misdemeanours and juvenile delinquency adjudications.
It is not only a matter of which proceedings are subject to double risk, but also of the beginning or attachment of danger.
This problem is critical because the government's acts before attacks, such as withdrawing the indictment, would not preclude further prosecutions against the same person for the same crime. The entire spectrum of Fifth Amendment rights from multiple charges and multiple fines takes place after the threat has been attached. For jury trials, as the jury is sworn, jeopardy attaches. In criminal trials tried without a jury by a judge, when the first witness is sworn in, danger is attached. When a defendant enters into a plea deal with the prosecutor, there is no risk until the plea is accepted by the judge. When double risk security ends, it is just as necessary to determine as when it starts, but it can be a little more difficult. The government does not arrest anyone for further court hearings on the same issue until the danger has ended.
Outcome: Recently, in the case of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Vimal kumar Surana, the court held that if an individual is convicted under a different rule, it cannot be considered to be a double threat. Under terms of the Chartered Accountant Act 1949, the defendant was convicted. The court held that it does not grant him immunity from prosecution simply because he is convicted by the clause of that act, because the aspect of the crime varies, and that he can be charged with a variety of different offences and different laws, including the Indian Penal Code. On the contrary, it is also important to know that if the characteristics of an offence are different from those of the accused, he would not be able to please the defence pursuant to section 300 of the CrPC, as it clearly sets out the requirement that a person may be prosecuted on the basis of the same facts if the offence contains different elements that are charged under penal law. Having said that, it is also critical that the case be prosecuted for an offence by a competent jurisdiction. And the authority alone should rule on a defendant's conviction or acquittal. As discussed in Assistant Controller of Customs v L. R. Malwanithat the proceedings before the Sea Customs authorities were not a 'prosecution' and the order for confiscation was not a 'punishment' levied by a court or judicial tribunal within the scope of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and was therefore not prevented from prosecuting him subsequently.